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ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
IN DIRE STRAITS:
THERE IS NO PROTECTION FOR NOTHING
AND NO DATA FOR FREE
Victor B. Flatt* & Paul M. Collins, Jr.t
Those charged with drafting and enforcing our environmental laws
have had to work with little or no information about whether or not these
programsare actually working properly. There are a host of reasonsfor this,
many of them having to do with availability of data that can be examined
empirically. Using newly available data on state actions in environmental
enforcement, and a new data set of state environmental expenditures which
they created, the authors of this Article are able to examine for the first time
the relationship between state environmental expenditures and the effectiveness of state environmental enforcement for all permitted sources. They conclude that state expenditures on environmental programs are strongly
associated with effective environmental compliance, which has important
implicationsfor environmental law and policy. The authors also examine
the debate over the effectiveness of cooperative-versus deterrence-basedenforcement, relate that to findings on state expenditures, and make suggestionsfor
improving the availability of data and environmental enforcement generally.
*
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INTRODUCTION

While much of the world debates what our environmental laws
should be,' the less esoteric question of whether the environmental
laws we do have are being properly enforced continues to be insufficiently examined. Yet this question is absolutely critical to any discussion of environmental protection or policy. Whether or not one
agrees with the goals of our current environmental statutes, determining whether and how environmental laws are enforced is critical to the
successful operation of any environmental law, present or future.
The question of how well environmental enforcement works is
really the question of whether our environmental laws get the jobs of
cleaning the environment and protecting public health done. In a
world of limited financial resources, the answer to this question must
include whether the job is done in the most effective and efficient way
possible. As we approach the fortieth anniversary of modem environmental laws, the answer to this "$64 billion question" still is not clear.
We are told that the environmental laws provide extraordinarily
high benefits if enforced properly. In its Draft Report to Congress on the
Costs and Benefits of FederalRegulation, the Office of Management and
Budget noted that the EPA estimated the total benefits of ten years of
Clean Air Act2 (CAA) enforcement would be $1.45 trillion, and the
benefits for enforcement of the more stringent regulation of criteria
pollutants since 1990 would exceed costs of $54 billion.3 Various
assumptions exist, however, relating to these estimates.4 More importantly, we don't know if these laws are being properly enforced. Even
though we can identify the many areas where pollution has been
reduced and environmental improvements have occurred, we are una1 See, e.g., Marcilynn A. Burke, Green Peace? ProtectingOur National Treasures While
Providingfor Our NationalSecurity, 32 Wm. & MARY ENvrT. L. & PoL'Y REV. 803, 805-11
(2008) (discussing requested changes to a host of federal environmental laws to
accommodate national security); Charles de Saillan, The Use of Imminent HazardProvisions ofEnvironmentalLaws to Compel Cleanup at FederalFacilities,27 STAN. ENvrTL. L.J. 43,
204-06 (2008) (advocating several amendments to federal environmental laws); Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalLaw in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA. ENvrTL. L.J. 1, 2-4
(2007) (describing a "remarkable, bipartisan burst" of environmental regulation over
the past three decades).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
3 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 65
Fed. Reg. 7197, 7203 (Feb. 11, 2000).
4 Professor Hsu presents a very good description of how environmental harms
and benefits, as well as the societal costs of regulation, may be routinely under- (or
sometimes over-) valued. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental
Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 433, 440-51 (2008).
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ble to clearly determine whether we are valuing and protecting the
environment in the most cost-effective and efficient way possible.
Numerous commentators have noted that the difference between
environmental laws that actually protect the environment and those
that do not is highly dependent on whether, and in what way, these
laws are enforced.5 Testing whether we are correctly and/or adequately enforcing our environmental laws, however, has proven
remarkably difficult as measures of environmental quality have
changed over time and differ between locations. 6 This makes the
actual connection between enforcement action and environmental
improvements very difficult to ascertain. The possibility of having any
more than broad-based measures of actual environmental quality
improvements or changes seems so difficult, especially when related
to enforcement mechanisms, that their pursuit may be impossible.
Throughout much of the history of environmental law, the
assumption has been that vigorous enforcement deters noncompliance with laws, and thus, brings about the desired outcomes.7 This
assumption is reflected in the very structure of the cooperative federalism model for the administration of environmental laws (i.e., if the
state is enforcing, it is doing a good job),8 as well as the theories
underlying citizen-suit provisions, which are only necessary when the

state or federal government is not fulfilling its enforcement role.9
However, merely examining the number of such actions taken against
noncomplying parties may not tell us much about the overall effective5 See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The CongressionalPrescription for Vigorous Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202, 203-11
(1987); Victor B. Flatt, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Law: Why the Clean Water Act Has Never
Grown Up, 55 ALA. L. REV. 595, 596-99 (2004); Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H.
Earnhart, The ComparativeEffectiveness of Government Interventions on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 317, 319-21 (2007); see alsoJOEL
A. MINTZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 5-15 (2007) (discussing various theories and objectives of environmental enforcement).
6 See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENvrTL. L. 29, 49 (2003); Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State Environmental Enforcement Performance
Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other Strategies, 33 ENVrL. L. REP.
10,559, 10,565 (2003).
7 Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 5, at 320.
8 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Access to the Courtsfor EnvironmentalPlaintiffs, 11 DUKE ENvrL. L. &
POL'Y F. 207, 234 (2001) (arguing that the environmental federalism standard allows
no or very little second guessing of state enforcement decisions).
9 See Peter A. Appel, The Diligent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits: The Search for
Adequate Representation, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 91, 91 (2004).
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ness of an environmental program.' 0 Because pollution sources may
be different and states may utilize different strategies, standards, and
penalties for enforcement, it is not obviously apparent that the number of actions taken to bring sources into compliance is a good measure of how effective different enforcement mechanisms may be in
reaching statutory goals."
Additionally, recent "second generation" regulatory proponents
have suggested that direct enforcement may not achieve effective
compliance (and thus, environmental improvements), and that socalled cooperative mechanisms may work better.12 As defined by
Professors Clifford Rechtschaffen and David Markell, authors of a
2003 book about environmental enforcement, cooperative-based
enforcement "eschews penalties in favor of persuasion."13 Cooperative-based enforcement suggests that carrots work better than sticks.
"Many states have actively championed this strategy," pushing towards
market mechanisms for pollution control, and proposing to change
environmental enforcement from primarily deterrence-based enforcement to a cooperative regime.' 4 Some of the cooperative-based
enforcement literature propounds the theory that in addition to better results, cooperative-based enforcement may cost less, and thus, be
a more cost-efficient form of effective environmental enforcement.15
Theories regarding different environmental policies and enforcement strategies are important to making environmental protection
efficient and responsive to societal needs. So where is the answer to
the question of whether we are enforcing our environmental laws in
the most effective and efficient ways possible? What is really needed is
an empirical examination of which kinds of environmental enforcement strategies work successfully.
The EPA has catalogued a trove of empirical analyses of measured environmental indicators and also of attitudes towards enforcement in the regulated community. Some of these studies (cited
below) also try to link these statistically with environmental outcome
10 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms
in CorporateEnvironmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 66 (2003) (citing Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1219 (1998)).
11 Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the
Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENvrTL. Ae. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1998).
12 See Rena 1. Steinzor, Myths of the Reinvented State, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 223, 231-32
(2001).
13 CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 2 (2003).
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 12, at 233.
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measurements.16 Because of the lack of comprehensive data on environmental noncompliance and variables we believe may have an
important relationship with enforcement, we attempt to go further
and bring something new to this analysis. Good attempts have been
made in the past and recently, and upon those attempts, we set out in
this Article to gather data and conduct statistical analyses that can take
the discussion even further. By using data painstakingly culled from
the states and combining them with newly available EPA enforcement
data, we put forward some important new conclusions regarding the
resource allocation necessary for effective environmental enforcement strategies.' 7 Just as importantly, we use the knowledge gained
from the process and results of data collection to propose ways that
data can be improved to make future analyses of environmental
enforcement and progress both easier and more useful. This is not an
easy task, especially given the difficulty in data retrieval and usage.
Certain theories on enforcement have political constituencies
that may be more concerned with political gain, or with spending
money on other priorities, than with cost-efficient and effective environmental regulation.' 8 Particularly now, in a time of falling state revenues, many states may not wish to learn that specific resource levels
are necessary for effective environmental enforcement. If the different strategies based on such theories are not held up for empirical
testing, however, then legislators, administrators, businesses, and environmentalists will keep asserting their differing views about what
works in enforcement and what does not. The citizens and the environment will thus be the ones to suffer. Environmental enforcement
strategies incur costs-to the government, regulated industries, and
society-when those strategies fail.' 9 We have a duty to acquire the
best data available to assist in making policy decisions for the benefit
of the whole, rather than for a select few.
In this Article, we attempt to answer important questions about
approaches to general enforcement across all industry groups, at least
partially, and to make recommendations based on these answers.
Additionally, we highlight the difficulty in acquiring the data necessary to make these comparisons effectively, and propose a systematic
16 See U.S. ENvmT. PROT. AGENCY, COMPLIANCE LrrERATURE SEARCH RESULTS
(2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/reports/compliance/
research/lit-results-2007.pdf (citing and summarizing more than two hundred compliance-related articles and books).
17 See discussion infra Parts IV & V.
18 See Steinzor, supra note 12, at 225, 228-32, 240-41.
19 Carol M. Rose, RethinkingEnvironmental Controls: Management Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-13.
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approach for collecting these data that makes enforcement effectiveness, and thus environmental protection, more transparent. In Part I,
we will discuss the different enforcement ideas and strategies and
what we would like to learn about them. In Part II, we set out the
research background, ultimate methodology, and data acquisition
chosen to answer these questions. Part III contains our analysis of the
results of the statistical analyses, Part IV contains our summary of the
core empirical findings and their implications, and Part V sets out the
policy prescriptions that can be drawn from this study.
I. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
A.

Theories of EnvironmentalEnforcement

The issue of the effectiveness of environmental enforcement is an
old one that begat the modern environmental laws. Though federalization of environmental laws is supported by the economic theory of
controlling all factors in a commons pollution problem, 20 as well as
providing a floor of environmental health for all U.S. citizens,2 1 much
of our modern environmental laws can be traced directly to the historic failures of state governments to address these harms themselves.2 2 Environmental law was traditionally local in origin. 23
Through the concept of public nuisance and later of zoning, the most
obvious environmental harms of the past-from raw sewage to choking smoke-were dealt with by local government. 24
As environmental harms increased, the ability of states or localities to control those harms did not seem to keep up with them. Even
when the federal government stepped in, both the CAA and the Clean
Water Act2 5 (CWA) (before their modern incarnations) relied primarily upon the states to do the regulation necessary to control environmental harms. 2 6 The states proved spectacularly unsuccessful,
however, giving impetus to the federal government to take the lead in
20 See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 12-15,
24 (2d ed. 2007).
21 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/
CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1551-52 (2007).
22 Flatt, supra note 11, at 7, 13-14 (explaining the failure of states to administer
the Clean Water Program).
23
2007);

24

See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 586-87 (5th ed.
ET AL., supfa note 20, at 3.
See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 65, 586-87.

JOHNSTON

25 Clean Water Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
26 SeeJOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 6-9.
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environmental law.2 7 A new kind of cooperative federalism was created, which moved beyond the traditional reliance on states to deal
with such issues, in favor of a state-federal mix of controls. 28 Though
the states were still to play a role, theoretically it was the federal government that would ensure a fail-safe system in case of state failure.29
The fail-safe system would occur primarily through federal oversightso
and federal ability to take over failing state programs. Though federal
oversight showed some strength at first, with the federal government
taking over state programs and ordering particular kinds of compliance, this changed quickly.31 For political reasons, some of the federal power was reduced.3 2 Moreover, the appetite for such
involvement with local issues, as well as the resources for such takeovers, quickly became a thing of the past.33
At this point, the states themselves began to assert their own
visions for environmental enforcement, and in the face of economic
downturns, many states perceived less aggressive environmental
enforcement as a way to maximize scarce state resources.3 4 Many
states thus prohibited themselves or localities from adopting any regulations that were more stringent than the federal government's, which
in effect made an environmental floor into a ceiling.3 5 Many states
also began actively pursuing a new cooperative-based enforcement
strategy, typified by the passage of audit-shield laws, which protected
polluters from environmental prosecutions if they corrected environmental problems, and also allowed them to avoid reporting of environmental violations.3 6 These two examples were but part of a larger
pattern. Whether because of state independence, flexibility, friendli27 SeeJerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive
Problems, 54 MD. L. REv. 1373, 1373-74 (1995).
28 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 9-10.
29 Flatt, supra note 11, at 15.
30 Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1567, 1587.
31 See Flatt, supranote 11, at 16-19; see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246,
265-69 (1976) (limiting EPA's authority to review state air pollution controls).
32 See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(i) (2006), originally added in
1977, which prohibits the Federal Administrator from requiring states to control indirect sources of air pollution, i.e. control of land use, for State Implementation Plan
program approval.
33 Flatt, supra note 11, at 16.
34 Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting: Is There a "Race" and is it
"To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 340-41, 359 (1997).
35 Organ, supra note 27, at 1376-77.
36 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 13, at 2, 179-81 (noting that almost
one-half of states passed audit privilege shield laws despite EPA objection).
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ness to business, or friendliness to state coffers, the late 1980s and
1990s saw a new wave of enforcement, wherein states were to
"reinvent" environmental enforcement to be more cooperative.3 7
Many environmental scholars were suspicious of such an agenda, and
noted that assertions of state primacy and "better" environmental
enforcement may be a screen for special interests, which would only
undermine environmental protection.3 8 Rechtschaffen and Markell
summarize this movement as follows:
Two major tenets, among others, lie at the heart of the movement to reinvent environmental regulation. The first is that environmental enforcement should be shifted from a deterrence-based
approach to one based on cooperation or compliance. The second
is that the federal government should devolve more environmental
responsibility and decisionmaking authority to the states. These two
distinct, yet related areas have generated enormous interest and
debate. From 1997 to 2000 alone, for example, the U.S. Congress
held over a dozen hearings on one of these two topics. 3 9

B. PriorEmpiricalAnalyses of EnvironmentalEnforcement
Despite the major shift in theories regarding enforcement in the
last two decades, empirical analyses and testing of these strategies have
been limited. Most of the data examining the effectiveness of either
deterrence- or compliance-based enforcement are industry specific. 40
In one case, Rechtschaffen and Markell note the importance of the
Harrison study from the 1990s, which compared pulp and paper mill
pollution sources in Canada and the United States. 4 1 The Canadian
sources, which were in the more cooperative-enforcement jurisdiction, showed less compliance. 42 Conversely, there have also been evaluations of smaller programs that have shown positive results from
using cooperative-based enforcement methods. 43 However, none of
these studies controlled for other factors that could have influenced
the outcomes, and many of the successful programs were resource
37 Id. at 1, 156.
38 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Next GenerationEnvironmental Law: A Response to Richard
Stewart, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 183, 189 (2001) (suggesting regulatory reform initiatives
are actually concerned with using deregulation in an attempt to advance the interests
of groups such as small businesses).
39 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 13, at 1-2.
40 See id. at 237-51.
41 Id. at 242.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 239-40.
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intensive, which does not support the theory that cooperative-based
enforcement saves money.44
From 2005 through 2008, a research group at the University of
Kansas surveyed opinions of major National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 4 5 (NPDES) permit holders to determine which types of
enforcement mechanisms were believed to be most effective, and also
sought to see what happened to source compliance following various
enforcement actions. 4 6 Their findings have been an important source
of new information, particularly about the effectiveness of state
enforcement versus federal enforcement. Through a complex analysis, the group was able to assess how state administrative actions compared with federal administrative actions in affecting the amount that
47
major chemical dischargers were over the NPDES-permitted limits.
The results tended to show that federal administrative actions were
more effective than state ones, thus complementing the earlier
research on state comparisons.4 8
In a follow up article, Professors Glicksman and Earnhart were
able to classify regulated sources into two categories depending on
whether permit terms had been modified or not modified, using that
differentiation as a marker for cooperative- versus deterrence-based
enforcement.4 9 (They supposed that sources with allowed permit
modifications were beneficiaries of cooperative-based enforcement.)5 0
Though this classification could provide a method for categorizing
the type of enforcement in some circumstances, for reasons noted
below, 5 1 such a comparison may be unavailable for large, general data
sets.
A 1996 through 1998 statistical analysis by one of the authors of
this Article looked at state enforcement of the CWA in two states and
examined enforcement across all industrial groups for that program. 5 2 The study found that although enforcement actions may have
44 Id. at 240-01 (explaining that Illinois and Nevada studies finding positive
changes in compliance did not distinguish between changes resulting from modifications to compliance approaches and those resulting from various other reforms).
45 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). Section 402 of the CWA established the NPDES. Id. § 1342.
46 Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 5, at 329-32.
47 Id. at 347-52.
48 Id. at 352.
49 Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, Effectiveness of Government Interventions at Inducing Better Environmental Pefomance: Does Effectiveness Depend on Facility or
Firm Features , 35 B.C. ENvT. AFF. L. REv. 479, 487-89 (2008).
50 Id. at 487.
51 See infra Part II.B.1.
52 See Flatt, supra note 11, at 21-26.

64

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:1

been occurring at the same rate, the individual nature of each state's
enforcement actions meant that actual compliance achievement was
not uniform even for similarly situated sources.5 3 This finding challenged the assumption that "enforcement" automatically leads to compliance and focuses us more on the type or kind of enforcement that
is occurring.
C. What Else Can We Learn About Enforcement?
Despite the prior empirical analyses, we still have no real idea to
what extent resource allocation is necessary for effective enforcement,
or whether cooperative- or deterrence-based enforcement is more
effective. How do we determine these answers? We know that states
are required to meet the same federal standards and implement the
same federal statutes.5 4 The states are also increasingly responsible
for primary enforcement of the environmental laws, which means that
their ability to effectively enforce the standards and the laws determines if our environment is protected.5 5 As a result, examining the
effectiveness of various state programs might be a good way to determine optimal enforcement strategy.
Particularly, it would be illuminating to analyze: (1) the effects of
budgeting by state environmental agencies on enforcement effectiveness; (2) the effectiveness of cooperative- versus deterrence-based
enforcement; (3) the effects of budget redeployment in state environmental agencies; and (4) the effects of state-enacted environmental
policies, such as lenient audit procedures. 56 These input variances
could be used to compare numerous states or a single state with itself,
if policies change temporally. Other theoretically relevant variables
could be accounted for through the inclusion of statistical control
variables. This would produce both general data for use by a state or
anyone else (e.g., this data might show that the state of Texas has a
higher percentage of noncompliant sources now than it did in 1990
for type, size, and source violations), or for use to statistically praise or
indict strategies (e.g., a statistical analysis of state enforcement agencies around the country could show that audit privilege laws are associated with less compliance by permitted sources). We would not have
to measure every state, only a statistically valid sampling thereof.
53
54
55
56
these

Id. at 26-27.
See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1550.
See Flatt, supra note 11, at 20.
For reasons explained in Part II.B.1, the data are not sufficient to test all of
questions. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
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The main impediment to such analysis is acquiring the data. In
addition to the acquisition of output-variable (i.e., dependent-variable) data on environmental source compliance noted above,5 7 many
of the input variables (i.e., independent variables), such as state funding directed to particular programs or state policies on enforcement,
require extensive digging even if they can be found or are available at
all. Our goal was to acquire the data necessary to answer our questions empirically, or if unable to secure the data, to make suggestions
on how policies should be changed to make the needed data available. Following are the interrelated stories of the construction of possible statistical methods for testing our findings, and the attempt to
gather data to provide the raw inputs for such analyses.
II.

RESEARCH BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA COLLECTION

A.

Outcome Measurement Issues

The underlying issue in trying to conduct the statistical analysis of
the effectiveness of any variable, such as different environmental
enforcement strategies, is determining an outcome measurement. In
the environmental arena this is particularly problematic because, in
general, there is no direct measurement of environmental quality.
Even in the cases where such measurements are being developed,
identical methods do not exist temporally or locationally; for example, today's analysis of water quality may be conducted differently
from that of ten years ago, or measurement methodologies in California may not be identical to those in North Carolina.5 8 Therefore, in
the environmental arena, there must be some effective substitute for
environmental markers that replicates or comes close to replicating
the actual state of the environment. Over time, the numbers of
enforcement actions and penalty amounts have been used as outcome
variables for federal environmental laws.5 9 However, each of these
variables suffers from the problem that it is itself a varying enforcement strategy and thus, a varying input variable. In other words, how
does one measure the effectiveness of stepped-up enforcement on
environmental health if stepped-up enforcement is the outcome
variable?
As a second-best option, one can try to test whether enforcement
actually alters the way that pollution sources comply with the law.6 0
57
58
59
60

See discussion supra Introduction.
See Adler, supra note 6, at 49.
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 13, at 247.
See Flatt, supra note 11, at 24.
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The average length of time violators are out of compliance may be
related to the actual harm that the environment is undergoing. 6 '
Courts have affirmed the assumption that violating congressionally
mandated standards can be reasonably assumed to harm the
environment.6 2
In a 1998 article, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of
Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), one of the authors of this Article
proposed using the average time a regulated source is noncompliant
as an outcome variable for environmental quality.6 3 This measure
assumes that the basic laws and standards, if enforced, are markers for
environmental health. 6 4 Even absent this assumption, it will always at
least be a marker of how long permitted sources are in technical violation of laws and standards, and thus it will at least always be an outcome variable for legal compliance with environmental standards.
This variable can thus be used to test whether various administrative
strategies-such as a budget devoted to environmental protection, or
cooperative- versus deterrence-based enforcement-are more likely to
lead to fewer violations of environmental standards. This is an appropriate measure because, even when the enforcement strategy changes,
the sources themselves must still self report technical compliance with
the standards on a monthly basis. Its use is limited though, as it fails
to capture those sources that are outside the regulatory net altogether
and so it cannot test whether we are regulating the correct things or
not. 65 Nor does it determine whether the permit terms themselves are
consistent with the legal requirements of the federal regulations
(another concern with administrative discretion). 66 It simply tells us
61 Id.
62 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 184-85
(2000) ("Here, in contrast, it is undisputed that Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-discharging pollutants in excess of permit limits-was occurring at the time the complaint was filed. Under Lyons, then, the only 'subjective' issue here is [t]he
reasonableness of [the] fear' that led the affiants to respond to that concededly ongoing conduct by refraining from use of the North Tyger River and surrounding areas.
Unlike the dissent ... we see nothing 'improbable' about the proposition that a company's continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would
cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and would
subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms. The proposition is entirely reasonable . . . ." (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.7, 108 n.8 (1983))).

63 Flatt, supra note 11, at 24.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 22.
66 Glicksman and Earnhart attempt to measure this. See Glicksman & Earnhart,
supra note 49, at 504-09.

2009]

ENVIRONMENTAL

ENFORCEMENT

IN

DIRE STRAITS

67

the effects of various regulatory strategies on the legal compliance
issues.
Nevertheless, we propose the use of noncompliance with permits
history, which are self reported, as the primary output variable to test
the effects of various enforcement strategies. In addition, we also
examine the amount of fines levied against facilities for environmental violations as a second means to gauge compliance. While this second measure is somewhat crude, it is nonetheless useful because
monetary fines can potentially act as a deterrent to polluting activities
and thus encourage facilities' compliance with environmental laws. 67
This proxy for enforcement thus assumes that facilities fined for environmental violations are more likely to come into compliance with
environmental regulations as a result of this enforcement strategy.
Of course we recognize that, while the size of fines appears to be
relevant to whether cooperative- or deterrence-based enforcement is a
primary strategy of a jurisdiction (i.e., one might assume that lower
fines are associated with cooperative-based enforcement), it is difficult
to disentangle this output variable from others. For instance, fines
might rise the longer a source is noncompliant (meaning higher fines
would be associated with longer periods of noncompliance), or conversely, higher initial fines may be an incentive for a source to become
compliant more quickly (meaning higher fines would be associated
with shorter periods of noncompliance). Despite these concerns, we
hope the relationship between fines levied and money spent on
enforcement sheds light on whether states with larger per capita environmental program expenditures are more likely to impose higher
punishments through higher fines. However, without information on
periods of noncompliance, which we do not have for the CWA data, it
may be difficult to disentangle the relationship between fines and
noncompliance periods.
67 See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, EmpiricalResearch on the DeterrentEffect of Environmental
Monitoring and Enforcement, 30 ENvT. L. REP. 10,245, 10,250 (2000) (suggesting that
public awareness of sanctions may damage the value and reputation of sanctioned
firms, helping to increase general environmental deterrence); Surabhi Kadambe &
Kathleen Segerson, On the Role of Fines as an Environmental Enforcement Tool, 41 J.
ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 217 (1998) (developing a model for analyzing the effect of
fine amounts on regulatory compliance); Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence
and CorporateEnvironmentalBehavior, 27 LAw & POL'Y 262, 278-83 (2005) (questioning
the "explicit" deterrent effect of fines but suggesting that they "implicitly" reinforce
the general deterrence of other informal sanctions). But see Montserrat Viladrich
Grau & Theodore Groves, The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on
Oil Spills, 10 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 315, 322-24 (1997) (noting that relatively low
fines had no significant effect on the frequency or size of oil spills).

68

NOTRE DAME

B.

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

85:1

Data

In order to conduct empirical research on environmental
enforcement, one must overcome data problems on the sources of
pollutants as well as the individual state factors that might influence
environmental compliance. Below, we discuss for comparison these
issues regarding federal pollution-source data from the EPA concerning pollution sources and individual state data concerning environmental funding and enforcement policies.
1. Federal Data from the EPA Concerning Pollution Sources
Historically, it has not been easy to gather information about the
compliance of particular sources with various environmental laws, let
alone to find ways of comparing them. 6 8 The EPA would, in theory,
have monitored state actions regarding permitted sources, but it had
no way to directly compare the intensity of the resolutions.6 9 In
response to continuing difficulties in tracking enforcement, the EPA
introduced its Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis (IDEA) in
the early 1990s. 70 IDEA, in theory, meant that all sources permitted
under any statute could be examined and compared with each other
and across media.7 ' Nevertheless, the introduction of IDEA has still
not generally enabled outside examinations of enforcement effectiveness for several reasons.
First, IDEA is generally complex and difficult to access, even to
those dedicated to getting the data.7 2 Second, the entire database is
not available to the public. Compliance data are presented to the
public through the system known as Enforcement and Compliance
System Online (ECHO) . ECHO purports to allow a user to acquire
data on compliance history, violations, and enforcement actions.7 4
The current online version also allows one to search for permitted
sources using several factors such as location, compliance, and his68 Flatt, supra note 11, at 18-19.
69 Id.
70 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis, http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/data/systems/multimedia/idea (last visited Oct. 26, 2009);
PeterJ. Fontaine, EPA's Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENvrT. L. 31, 57-58 (1993).
71 See id.
72 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 87.
73 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Enforcement & Compliance History Online,
http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
74 See id.
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tory;7 5 however, this is not in a format that allows for the downloading
of data to conduct comparisons across state variables.7 6 Third, at the
time we proposed this study, the public ECHO search would only
allow the return of 1000 data hits. 7 7
Further compounding those limitations, data available on ECHO
do not contain a description of the permitted source that would allow
a researcher to control for source differences in making comparisons
of compliance of sources between states.7 For example, although a
single numeric indicator such as quarters of noncompliance could be
compared across states, such a comparison would be a sloppy use of
data and a meaningless comparison without accounting for source differences.7 9 Additionally, through a blocking program, the EPA prevents data from being downloaded from the ECHO site by a computer
system, thus requiring manual entry of data. 0
A second, more complete Online Targeting Information System 8
(OTIS) allows some online queries of the full IDEA database, but is
only available to the EPA, the federal government, and state governments. 8 2 By only allowing the data to be accessed through queries,
data from OTIS cannot be directly downloaded into a program file.
Therefore, one cannot introduce different variables, such as state
enforcement spending, in order to do statistical comparisons between
state enforcement actions. 3 To conduct a statistical comparison
using IDEA data with other data, the IDEA data would have to be
reentered into a spreadsheet to allow a computer program to conduct
the many mathematical calculations necessary to do a statistical
comparison. 8 4
75 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ECHO Compliance Data Search (Air Program),
http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/compliance-report-air.html
(last visited Oct. 26,
2009).
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Memorandum from Victor B. Flatt to Member Scholars of the Ctr. for Progressive Reform on Sufficiency of IDEA Data for Proposed Analysis (May 1, 2005)
[hereinafter Flatt Memorandum] (on file with the authors).
79 Id.
80 Id. This is ostensibly because of the large computer time costs the EPA would
incur through such a download. Because our study has hundreds of thousands of
pieces of data, this would make analysis virtually impossible.
81 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Online Tracking Information System, http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/data/systems/multimedia/aboutotis.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2009).
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 Because of this difficulty, in 1998, one of the authors only conducted a comparison of two states for one environmental program, the CWA. The summarized
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Faced with this data problem, in April 2005, we contacted EPA
personnel who worked in the Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance.8 5 A representative of this office confirmed that the IDEA
database contained all of the compliance data (including the data that
would allow a control of extraneous factors in a state comparison) for
three major federal environmental laws: the CAA, the CWA, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act8 6 (RCRA).
We also learned that it was possible for the public to directly
access the IDEA data. One would simply need to obtain an EPA mainframe user identification and account (to compensate for the costs of
searching) and obtain remote access via a web browser.8 7 The EPA
representative informed us that the amount of data that we would be
using and manipulating might not be downloadable over the Internet,
and might require working at one of the mainframe computers either
at the EPA's headquarters in Washington, D.C., or at their research
contractor's facility in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 88
Another EPA employee in the same office, who wished to remain
anonymous, sent us the description for all variables in the IDEA
database, specifically, which fields can be searched or downloaded. 9
We learned that the downloaded data could then be transferred into
Microsoft Excel and thus into common statistical analysis programs.
The full description of these data fields has been made available
online.9 0
The description of the data fields in IDEA seemed to indicate
that if we could obtain these data, we could meet our research needs.
data was received from the states themselves, and even only two years worth of data
required the manual entry of over 10,000 data points. See Flatt, supra note 11, at 35
app. A.
85 See Flatt Memorandum, supra note 78.
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006).
87 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis, http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/data/systems/multimedia/idea (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
88 See Flatt Memorandum, supra note 78.
89 Id.
90 These data fields were received from EPA in 2004, and are on file with the
authors and available online as research appendices. See Victor B. Flatt, Research
Appendices, http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/flattvictorb/research.aspx
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Flatt, Research Appendices]. For EPA data
pertaining to the CAA [hereinafter Clean Air Data], follow the link for "Clean Air,"
and for EPA data pertaining to the CWA [hereinafter Clean Water Data], follow the
link for "Clean Water." These data fields and all other research appendices are also
available online through the Notre Dame Law Review. See Notre Dame Law Review,
Archive: Vol. 85, No. 1, http://www.ndlawreview.org/archive/issue.php?vol=85&num
=1 (follow link for "Research Appendices") (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
Notre Dame Law Review, Research Appendices].

200g]

ENVIRONMENTAL

ENFORCEMENT

IN

DIRE

STRAITS

71

With respect to the air data, the number of quarters that a source is
noncompliant-one of our proposed dependent variables-is listed
for the two years preceding the date of a facility's inspection.9 '
There were also data fields that would help us to control for differences between sources, including: (1) which air programs are permitted, such as the New Source Review or Prevention of Significant
Deterioration; (2) what kind of a source is under consideration based
on the Standard Industrial Classification Code List (allowing us to categorize like sources with like sources); (3) the size of source pollution
(e.g., greater than a hundred tons per year of major pollutant); (4)
the pollutant subject to most serious compliance violation; and (5)
the source's federal regulation status.9 2 With respect to the use of
number of quarters a source is in noncompliant status, there are variables that describe the kind of noncompliance more specifically (e.g.,
whether it is a procedural or a permitting violation). This indicated
that we could separate reporting violations from permit violations.
There are also fields that assist in testing the dependent variables that
we have at issue. There are fields that show the amount of penalty,
the action taken (closed, fined, etc.), and the date of a completed
compliance action.9 3
By examining the field descriptions, we were able to determine at
least one possible way that we could conduct the research on comparative enforcement, assuming we could get the data. It seemed that the
relationship between compliance amount and compliance date, and
the number of quarters in violation in the two years preceding a facility's inspection date could be compared with state enforcement policies (funding, etc.) while controlling for differences in the sources.
Though the time divisions were gross (number of quarters in violation
for the two years preceding the inspection date), they provided some
discrimination on noncompliance information regarding a state's
dominant enforcement attitude. It also seemed that the water and
RCRA data have similar markers, which would allow for similar analysis. Both the water and RCRA data also allowed for distinctions
between types of permitted facilities, and both had fields that corresponded to violation determination, history, and status. 94
91 See Clean Air Data, supra note 90.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See Clean Water Data, supra note 90. The units of analyses in these databases
are the facility-inspection date and the type-classification. This means that each facility appears in the data on the basis of the date of the compliance inspection and the
type of compliance inspection.
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Despite all of the restrictions on the data usage online, an EPA
employee was willing to transfer the raw data for all three programs to
us for these research purposes free of charge, allowing us to directly
load it into a spreadsheet. From there, we could input information
corresponding to measures of state-level environmental spending and
the political orientation of a state's political elite.
Although we obtained data covering compliance with the Aeromatic Information Retrieval System (AIRS) Facility Subsystem (involving compliance with the CAA), the NPDES (involving compliance
with the CWA), and the RCRA (involving compliance with hazardous
waste management provisions of RCRA), we were unable to extract
information regarding the penalties assessed against a facility for violations of RCRA or the number of quarters a facility was in violation of
RCRA requirements. Further, we were unable to extract information
related to the number of quarters a facility was in violation of the
CWA.95 As a result, our empirical analyses focus only on the following
dependent variables: (1) the penalties assessed against facilities for
violations of CWA regulatory requirements; (2) the penalties assessed
against facilities for violations of CAA regulatory requirements; and
(3) the number of quarters (in the two years preceding the inspection
date) that facilities were in violation of compliance with CAA regulatory requirements. In other words, due to a lack of data availability,
we exclude compliance with RCRA requirements from our empirical
analyses.
2.

Data From States for Comparison Purposes

Since we wished to examine the relationship between state funding, attitudes about cooperative- versus deterrence-based enforcement, and a source's noncompliance status, we needed a way to
operationalize these concepts. With respect to state "attitudes," we
originally hoped to be able to examine specific legislative, regulatory,
or executive branch requirements that might direct a state environmental agency to choose one of these methods. Since there were no
95 Rather bewilderingly, the NPDES data codebook indicates that it contains a
variable composed of the number of quarters a facility is in violation of CWA requirements over the two years preceding a facility's inspection date (labeled Historic Noncompliance Quarter). According to the NPDES codebook, this variable takes on
values ranging from one to eight. However, in the actual data, this variable does not
take on these values, but rather contains year-quarter entries (e.g., 20011, 20012,
20013, 20014) that do not correspond to the number of quarters a facility is in violation of CWA requirements in the manner described in the codebook and do not
range from one to eight (even after removing the year from the variable entries). See
Clean Water Data, supra note 90.
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uniform words in either legislation or regulation to indicate such a
direction, we believed that the most direct way to get this information
was from the enforcement staffs of the state environmental agencies
themselves. Similarly, because states had different methods of
organizing their state environmental organizations, we would probably have to depend on the state agencies to tell us how much of each
state's budget had gone to enforcement programs.
Because we realized that obtaining this much information on an
individual basis might be difficult and time consuming, we decided to
use a selection of states in this comparison rather than examine the
data from all states. The most populous states generally have the most
sources,9 6 so the inclusion of these states allows us to both examine
the environment in which more people live, as well as increase the
number of data points without additional work or complexity. Thus,
our sample contains most of the largest states in the country. Because
we are examining attitudes about environmental enforcement, and
because these attitudes have at least loosely been correlated with political orientation and possibly with regional differences,9 7 we felt that
the sample needed to include states from different regions that were
governed by different political elites with varying ideologies. In particular, in selecting the large states, it was important to select states with
different political orientations. Finally, some states have relatively
unique and important environmental values, and this was also used in
making the selection.
The states selected were Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, NewJersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee,
and Texas. Though we originally hoped to obtain data for ten years,
because we only had four years of source data from the EPA
(2000-2003), we focused on the overlapping time in the states
searched. Research assistants working on the project performed an
extensive search of online databases to determine if any of this information had been compiled in one place.9 8 Without success, our attention turned to individual state sources. The research assistants then
96 See sources cited infra note 101.
97 See, e.g., Riley E. Dunlap et al., Politics and Environment in America: Partisanand
Ideological Cleavages in Public Support for Environmentalism, 10 ENvTL. POL. 23, 28-33
(2001); David M. Konisky, Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom
Argument, 18J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 321, 323 (2007); Eugene S. Uyeki & LaniJ.
Holland, Diffusion of Pro-Environment Attitudes?, 43 Am. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 646, 658-60
(2000).
98 E-mail from Phillip Shotts, Research Assistant, University of Houston Law
Center, to Author (Feb. 16, 2006, 2:11 CST) (on file with the author).
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obtained contact information for each state's environmental agency.9 9
With this information, and an initial round of phone calls and e-mails,
they were able to obtain budget information on environmental spending practices for eight of the eighteen states.10 0
The states' budget numbers did not contain similarly defined categories. For example, the states might report budgets based on
authorizations or expenditures, and the budgets might be subdivided
by medium (air, water) or by expense category (personnel, fines,
etc.). 10 It seemed that the best option we had for comparing budget
numbers was to start with the largest common categories that were
informative. We decided that this would be total environmental
expenditures, assuming that most states categorized "environmental"
similarly.
The location of this information varied from state to state. Our
research assistants began using the "yellow book of state government"
to locate contact persons in specific agencies for information. 102 We
received at least skeletal budget information from most of the states
quickly. This information was obtained either directly from the state
agency or through sources to which research assistants were directed
by the state agency.1 03 Some information was found through online
research.

99 See Jere Overdyke & Emily Buckles, Enviro Budget Contacts (May 17, 2006)
(unpublished spreadsheet) (on file with author).
100 SeeJere Overdyke, Flatt Research JCO Additions (May 17, 2006) (unpublished
spreadsheet) (on file with author).
101 For full breakdowns of the states' budgets from each year, see Flatt, Research
Appendices, supra note 90 (follow links under "State Budget Data") (last visited Oct.
2, 2009) [hereinafter State Budget Data]; Notre Dame Law Review, Research Appendices, supra note 90.
102 E-mail from Ben Rhem, Research Assistant, University of Houston Law Center,
to Author (Sept. 22, 2009, 18:01 CST) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Rhem Email].
103 We obtained budget information from the following sources: Arizona Department of Environmental Quality; California Environmental Protection Agency; California State Library; Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, Budget and
Financial Management Division; Florida Department of Environmental Quality; Georgia Department of Natural Resources; Indiana Department of Environmental Management, Office of External Affairs; Kansas Department of Health and Environment;
Maryland Department of Environment; North Carolina Department of Natural
Resources and Environment, Budget and Planning; Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Fiscal Administration; Oregon Department of Environmental Quality; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. See State Budget Data, supra note
101.
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State per Capita Environmental Spending

A cursory examination of the state budget data seemed to indicate wide swings in per capita environmental spending, 104 so we revisited each state's budget data to see how the budget was broken down.
In several cases, we discovered that the budget numbers were not
comparable after all. The most common differences occurred in
whether broad health, agriculture, or recreation programs (such as
hunting or fishing) were included in the state's "environmental" or
"natural resource" category. We made adjustments to the figures of
some of the states as appropriate.1 0 5
Ultimately, though we contacted sources in Georgia multiple
times, we received no return calls or information; therefore, Georgia
was dropped from consideration. With this data in hand, our measure
of State per CapitaEnvironmental Spending represents each of the seventeen states' per capita environmental spending, calculated by year.
This variable allows us to examine the relationship between state environmental spending and compliance with CAA and CWA regulatory
requirements.
b.

State Ideology

As noted above, we were also interested in whether the choice
between cooperative- versus deterrence-based enforcement strategies
has a significant effect on source compliance. After conducting
research on such state policies, we could find no uniform legislative or
regulatory marker indicating whether one of these enforcement "attitudes" was dominant in a particular state. As an alternative, we followed Glicksman and Earnhart, who proposed using permit
modification as a marker for cooperative- versus deterrence-based
enforcement on the logical assumption that a permit modification
demonstrated a cooperative action. 0 6 However, we realized that
because Glicksman and Earnhart examined only a subset of CWA
data 07 corresponding to the chemical industry, their permit-modified
variable exhibited much more variability than a congruent measure in
our data, since our data set is more expansive. More specifically, in
our CWA data, only 700 observations indicate that a permit was modified, out of 101,498 total observations-less than 0.70%. Accordingly,,
due to the limited variability in the permits modified for facilities in
104
105
Dame
106
107

See State Budget Data, supra note 101.
For data corrections, see Flatt, Research Appendices, supra note 90; Notre
Law Review, Research Appendices, supra note 90.
Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 49, at 487.
Id. at 483.
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our data, we were unable to rigorously control for cooperative-based
enforcement using a permit-modified variable.1 0 8 Further, we were
unable to locate a similar permit-modified variable in our CAA data.
Because cooperative-based enforcement has been associated with
a conservative political viewpoint,1 0 9 we examined whether the political orientations of state political actors are related to compliance with
environmental regulations. This provided us with the opportunity to
determine whether facilities located in states governed by conservative
political actors are more or less likely to comply with environmental
regulations as compared to facilities operating in states governed by
liberal political actors. Because our data contain a sample of states
that vary widely in terms of both their geography and political orientation, we were cognizant of the fact that a Republican in NewJersey is
not the same as a Republican in Texas. Accordingly, relying solely on
the political party affiliations of the state political elite (i.e., governor
and legislature) was undesirable, because such a modeling strategy
would make the assumption that all Democrats and all Republicans
are created equal, regardless of the geographical location and political history of the state.
Thus, we needed a proxy for State Elite Ideology that was capable of
capturing the nuances between the political ideologies of the American states. Fortunately, William Berry and his coauthors ("Berry et
al.") provide such a measure. 110 This measure, calculated yearly for
each state, is based on three points of information: interest group ratings of a state's members of Congress, the power division among
Republicans and Democrats in a state's legislative chambers, and the
ideology of a state's governor.1 ' These scores have been shown to
have substantial face validity and are able to capture the differences
between the underlying ideologies of the major political parties that
vary between states.1 12 For example, in 2003, Republicans controlled
both the legislative and executive branches in Texas, as they did in
108 When we include such a variable in our CWA models, the permit modification
variable fails to attain statistical significance anywhere near conventional levels.
109 See, e.g., John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of
AdministrativeEffectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 115, 123 (1991) (testing "the corollary
that Democrats will be less associated with cooperative enforcement than
Republicans").
110 William D. Berry et al., MeasuringCitizen and Government Ideology in the American
States, 1960-93, 42 Am. J. POL. Sci. 327, 330-31 (1998). These ideology scores have
subsequently been updated through 2006. See Richard C. Fording, State Citizen &
Government Ideology, http://www.uky.edu/-rford/stateideology.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2009) (containing updated ideology scores through 2007).
111 Berry et al., supra note 110, at 330-31.
112 Id. at 341-43.
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2001 in New Jersey. Reflecting the fundamental differences between
the Republican parties in Texas and New Jersey, Berry et al. score
Texas in 2003 as very conservative (8.93), while they score New Jersey
in 2001 as much more moderate (50.23), even though both states
were controlled by the Republican Party. Given the power offered by
the Berry et al. scores, we utilized them to operationalize our measure
of State Elite Ideology. This variable ranges from 0 to 97.5, with higher
scores reflecting more liberal state elite ideologies.' 1 3
In addition to our key independent variables (State per Capita
Environmental Spending and State Elite Ideology), we also controlled for
attributes of the facilities through the inclusion of dummy variables.
In the models capturing a facility's compliance with CAA regulatory
requirements, we include 12 dummy variables controlling for the Air
Program Code of the facility, 15 dummy variables accounting for the
National Action Type Code of the facility, and 113 dummy variables
controlling for the Standard Industrial Code clusters of the facility. In
the model capturing a facility's compliance with CWA regulatory
requirements, we include 94 dummy variables controlling for the
Enforcement Action Code of the facility, 31 dummy variables accounting for the Inspection Type Code of the facility, and 97 dummy variables controlling for the Standard Industrial Code clusters of the
facility. 11 4 The purpose of including these controls is to allow us to
"hold all else constant" in interpreting the influence of our central
explanatory variables of interest. Accordingly, although we include
these dummy variables in the statistical models, we do not report the
coefficients associated with these variables.

113 As an alternative to the Berry et al. scores, we operationalized a measure of
elite ideology based on the political party affiliation of a state's legislative and executive branches scored such that: 6 = unified Democrat (governor and legislature), 5 =
Democratic governor, divided legislature, 4 = Democratic governor, Republican legislature, 3 = Republican governor, Democratic legislature, 2 = Republican governor,
divided legislature, 1 = unified Republican (governor and legislature). This information was collected from each state's legislative website, the website of the National
Governor's Association, and individual contacts with the following agencies: Colorado
Legislative Council Staff; Connecticut State Library; Kansas State Library; New Jersey
State Library; Maryland Department of Legislative Services; State Library of Ohio; and
New Mexico State Library. This alternative measure is correlated with the variable
employed here at the 0.8 level. Substituting it for the measure utilized in this Article
does not alter the substance of the results.
114 The number of dummy variables accounting for the Standard Industrial Code
clusters of facilities differs in the CAA and CWA models due to the fact that a smaller
number of Standard Industrial Code clusters are applicable to facilities appearing in
the CWA data.
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EMPIRCAL RESULTS

Table 1 reports the results of the model that captures the penalty
assessed against a facility in violation of compliance with CWA regulatory requirements. As our dependent variable,' 1 5 the monetary penalty levied against a facility is a continuous variable, and we utilize
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to model the influence of
State per Capita Environmental Spending and State Elite Ideology on the
penalty assessed against a facility.' 16 This table reveals that the more a
state spends per capita on its environmental budget, the higher the
fines levied against polluters for violations associated with the CWA.
In substantive terms, for each $1 per capita increase in state environmental spending, the fine levied against a facility increases by about
$18, holding all else constant. A one standard deviation increase from
the mean of state environmental spending (raising per capita spending from $27.60 to $39) increases the penalty levied against a polluter
by $204.50, ceteris paribus. The results of our proxy for State Elite Ideology indicates that, as a state's political elite become more liberal, the
fines levied against polluters for violations of CWA regulatory requirements decrease. All else equal, a one-unit increase in the liberalism of
the state's political elite corresponds to a $14 decrease in the monetary penalty levied against a polluter. A one standard deviation
increase from the mean of State Elite Ideology (increasing State Elite Ideology from 43.9 to 70.4) decreases the penalty assessed against a facility
by $379.48, ceteris paribus.

115 The mean of the dependent variable in Table 1 is 903.8 (standard deviation =
15,159.87; range = 0 to 792,000). The data used in Table 1 include facilities that were
assessed monetary penalties for violations of CWA regulatory requirements, as well as
those facilities that were not assessed monetary penalties. The data contain 25,282
unique observations of facilities, meaning that, on average, facilities appear in the
data 3.93 times. To account for this nonindependence of observations, we estimate
the regression model employing robust standard errors, clustered on facility. See generally, M. Arellano, Computing Robust Standard Errorsfor Within-Groups Estimators, 49
OxFoRD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 431 (1987) (explaining a formula for calculating robust
standard errors).
116 See generally CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN, INTERPRETING AND USING REGRESSION
18-34 (John L. Sullivan & Richard G. Niemi eds., 1982) (providing an overview of
OLS regressions); DAMODAR N. GujARATI & DAWN C. PORTER, BASIC ECONOMETRICS
55-80 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining the methodology behind and relative simplicity of
the OLS regression model).
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REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE PENALTY ASSESSED

AGAINST A FACILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE

Variable
State per Capita
Environmental Spending

CWA, 2000-2003
Coefficient
17.94*
(8.43)

State Elite Ideology

-14.32*
(3.74)

Constant

-443.06
(649.1)

R

2

N

0.075

101,498

*p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
Entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses
indicate robust standard errors, clustered on facility.
Model includes 94 dummy variables controlling for the Enforcement Action Code of
the facility, 31 dummy variables controlling for the Inspection Type Code of the
facility, and 97 dummy variables controlling for the Standard Industrial Code clusters
of the facility (results not shown).
Sample includes the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, NewJersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.

Table 2 presents the results of the model that captures influences
on the penalty assessed against a facility for violations of compliance
with CAA regulatory requirements. As with Table 1, because our
dependent variable"' 7 is continuous, we utilize OLS regression. The
results of the CAA model indicate, unlike the results of the CWA
model, that neither State per Capita Environmental Spending nor State
Elite Ideology influences the monetary penalty assessed against a facility.
This is evidenced by the fact that the coefficients associated with these
variables fail to obtain statistical significance at conventional levels.

117 The mean of the dependent variable in Table 2 is 2250.3 (standard deviation =
60,139.4; range = 0 to 8,000,000). The data used in Table 2 include three facilities
that were assessed monetary penalties for violations of CAA regulatory requirements,
as well as those facilities that were not assessed monetary penalties. The data contain
15,407 unique observations of facilities, meaning that, on average, facilities appear in
the data 6.59 times. To control for the nonindependence of observations, we estimate the regression model utilizing robust standard errors, clustered on facility.
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CAA, 2000-2003
Coefficient
-2.59
(31.90)
-2.83
(6.86)
8855.30
(10,435.90)
0.007

99,428

Entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses
indicate robust standard errors, clustered on facility.
Model includes 12 dummy variables controlling for the Air Program Code of the
facility, 15 dummy variables controlling for the National Action Type Code of the
facility, and 113 dummy variables controlling for the Standard Industrial Code
clusters of the facility (results not shown).
Sample includes the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.

Table 3 reports the results of the model that captures the number
of quarters (in the two years preceding the inspection date) that a
facility was in violation of the CAA regulatory requirements. As this
dependent variable' 1 8 is a non-negative count, we utilized a negative
binomial regression model. 1 9 Because the parameter estimates of the
118 The mean of the dependent variable in Table 3 is 1.55 (standard deviation =
2.01; range = 0 to 8). The data used in Table 3 include facilities that were in violation
of CAA regulatory requirements, as well as those facilities that were not in violation of
CAA regulatory requirements. The data contain 25,282 unique observations of facili-

ties, meaning that, on average, facilities appear in the data 3.93 times. To account for
this nonindependence of observations, we estimate the negative binomial regression
model employing robust standard errors, clustered on facility.
119 The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is preferable to the OLS
regression model given the makeup of our dependent variable. The NBRM is distinct
from the most obvious alternative, the Poisson model, in that the NBRM does not
make the assumption that the variance is equal to the conditional mean of the dependent variable. Rather, the NBRM estimates a parameter, a, that accounts for the
unobserved heterogeneity among observations in the data. In order to test for the
appropriateness of the NBRM as compared with the Poisson model, we estimated a
log likelihood test for overdispersion in the data, which indicates that the NBRM is
the more appropriate modeling strategy. For a general discussion of the NBRM, see,
for example, A. CouN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT
DATA 70-77 (1998) (discussing generally the use of the NBRM) andJ. Scorr LONG &
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TABLE 3. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER
OF QUARTERS A FAcILITY IS IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA, 2000-2003
Variable

A% "

Coefficient

State per Capita
Environmental

-. 006*
(.003)

-0.6*

-. 002*
(.001)

+0.2*

Spending

State Elite Ideology

.513
.5)

Constant
a

(.225)
3.98 (.290)*

Wald X2
N

34,651.06*
99,428

*p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
a Indicates percentage change in the number of quarters a facility is in violation of
compliance with Clean Air Act Regulatory Requirements corresponding to a one-unit
change in the independent variable.
Entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses
indicate robust standard errors, clustered on facility.
Model includes 12 dummy variables controlling for the Air Program Code of the
facility, 15 dummy variables controlling for the National Action Type Code of the
facility, and 113 dummy variables controlling for the Standard Industrial Code
clusters of the facility (results not shown).
Sample includes the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.

independent variables in the negative binomial regression model cannot be interpreted directly (as in an OLS regression model), Table 3
also reports the percentage change in the number of quarters a facility is in violation of CAA regulatory requirements corresponding to a
one-unit change in each independent variable. This Table reveals
that as state environmental spending increases, the number of
quarters that a facility is in violation of CAA regulatory requirements
decreases. In substantive terms, for each $1 per capita increase in
state environmental spending, the number of quarters a facility is in

violation of the CAA decreases by 0.6%, ceteris paribus. For example,
compared with a state that spends $28 per capita on the environment,
in a state that spends $68 per capita, the number of quarters a facility
JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARI-

ABLES USING STATA 372-75 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining the advantages of NBRM com-

pared to the Poisson regression model).
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is in violation of the CAA decreases by 0.2 quarters, as illustrated in
Figure 1. Table 3 also indicates that, as a state's political elite ideology
becomes more liberal, the number of quarters a facility is in violation
of CAA regulatory requirements increases. More substantively, for
each one unit increase in state elite liberalism, the number of quarters
a facility is in violation of the CAA increases by 0.2%, all things being
equal. A one standard deviation increase from the mean of elite ideology (increasing state elite ideology from 48.1 to 80.2) increases the
number of quarters a facility is in violation of the CAA by 6%, ceteris
pafibus.
FIGURE

1.

THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF QUARTERS A FACILITY IS IN

VIOLATION OF THE

CAA

AS A FUNCTION OF STATE PER

CAPITA ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING
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IV.

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Taken as a whole, the results from our analyses are both expected
and surprising. The most important finding is that, with regard to the
CAA, the more a state spends per capita on its environmental budget,
the shorter time a permitted source is in violation of the Act. Assuming that we have adequately controlled for differences in fines based
on the type of facility and type of violation (as we attempted to do),
this finding supports the conclusion that funding of environmental
programs plays a very important role in how successful an agency is in

2009]

ENVIRONMENTAL

ENFORCEMENT

IN

DIRE STRAITS

83

avoiding, catching, and/or ending violations. Both the substantive
and statistical effects of this relationship are strong. To the extent
that support for cooperative-based enforcement has been premised
on accomplishing compliance at a cost savings, we show that, at least
at this time, "cost savings" in environmental programs are strongly
associated with less compliance, and thus, should be removed as a supporting reason for using more cooperative types of enforcement.
While this does not reject the idea that cooperative enforcement may
assist compliance in some circumstances, or that it can be productively
paired with deterrence-based enforcement in certain circumstances
(as detailed by Rechtschaffen and Markell),120 it does indicate that, at
this time at least, whatever effective cooperative enforcement has been
used would not have resulted in significant cost savings. There are, of
course, substantial limitations to our conclusion. Because of the data
sets, we can only measure environmental spending at its broadest
level. This only supports our conclusion if overall spending on the
environment is, percentage-wise, similar to CAA enforcement spending. We explore this data problem more infra Part V.B.
To the extent that the standards set forth in our environmental
laws result in environmental protection, we have also shown that
increased state environmental spending translates into better compliance, thus potentially improving the quality of the environment.
Unfortunately, with regard to the CWA data, we were not able to show
the same correlation because the EPA incorrectly entered the data for
the important variable that measures how many quarters a source is
noncompliant. We also do not know how splitting environmental
budgets into different categories in each state might help in more efficient enforcement. Nevertheless, this result is important.
We also found that for administration of the CWA, the more a
state spends per capita on its environmental budget, the higher the
fines levied against polluters. Though we cannot make any definitive
conclusion about how this relates to noncompliance times, if the CAA
results were replicated in the CWA context, it might indicate that
higher fines (which are associated with deterrence-based enforcement) spur compliance, or that higher per-capita-spending states support higher fines.
Our results also indicate that facilities are assessed larger fines for
violations of the CWA and remain out of compliance with the CAA for
shorter periods of time in states governed by conservative political
elites. To the extent our other results suggest that cooperative-based
enforcement, or at least cooperative-based enforcement premised on
120

RECHTSCHAFFEN &

MARKELL, supra note 13, at 251-52.
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cost savings, is not particularly effective, this result might seem surprising, particularly if we believe that conservative political ideologies are
more likely to be associated with cooperative-based enforcement.
Because we do not know how ideology actually relates to cooperative- versus deterrence-based enforcement, we can draw no real conclusions. However, these findings do give rise to interesting
speculation. The CWA finding could suggest that conservative ideologies allow polluters to reach worse violations, which in turn support
higher fines. Conversely, the CAA finding may suggest that conservative state ideologies foster better compliance, perhaps through the use
of more cooperative methods. It is possible that adding the carrot of
cooperative schemes for enforcement in certain circumstances to the
stick of deterrence-based enforcement may improve results overall.
This is suggested by Rechtschaffen and Markell, who note that "[a]
system that is purely or primarily deterrence-based can be improved
by integrating features of the cooperative model, such as more
emphasis on agency advice and consultation, and incentives for voluntary self-policing."1 2 1
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT POLICY

A.

Resource Allocation

Resources do matter. For purposes of enforcement policy, this is the
most important finding in our research. The strong relationship
between per capita spending on state environmental programs and
shorter noncompliance times in the CAA across many states of different sizes, environmental challenges, and political governance, suggests this. That "resources do matter" means that states cannot
adequately do theirjobs in enforcing environmental laws without necessary resources. While our study does not show any "optimal" level of
resource expenditure on environmental programs, it does show that a
lack of spending creates noncompliance rates outside what the American public would assume or expect for enforcement of environmental
programs. Presumably, this implication is generalizable to federal
environmental enforcement as well. Coupled with the results demonstrating that more resources lead to higher fines, the study also suggests that deterrence-based enforcement is important in actually
creating effective compliance.
The efficacy of cooperative-based enforcement, either alone or in
combination with deterrence-based enforcement, is harder to evaluate. We can see that at least during the time of our study, no coopera121

Id. at 251.
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tive-based enforcement was able to successfully produce effective
environmental compliance at a significantly lower cost. We do note
that a more conservative political ideology is related to better compliance, and that conservative political ideologies have been more generally supportive of cooperative-based enforcement. The substantive
effect of elite ideology is not as strong as the effect of per capita state
spending on the environment, but it is provocative. As noted above, it
might suggest that some combination of cooperative- and deterrentbased enforcement is the optimal formula. We do know that it does
not suggest that "leaner" government, at least in terms of environmental expenditures, will lead to better compliance. One cannot get compliance on the cheap. Whether one uses cooperative- or deterrencebased enforcement, one still must spend money to protect the
environment.
B.

Importance of Data to Understandingthe Effectiveness of
Environmental Policies

The other important implication from our four-year study is
related to the acquisition and reporting of the data. Though we
believe that this study goes further than some previous studies and
provides strong evidence as to the importance of sufficient funds to
promote environmental compliance, it does not answer more subtle
questions directly. These questions can only be answered by an
improvement in the availability of relevant data. For instance, to
more thoroughly test the efficacy of cooperative-based enforcement,
we would need to procure data from each state about how money in
environmental enforcement is spent in each arena. The gross per
capita numbers that we were able to retrieve from the states do not
give the more tailored information of exactly how much a state spends
on which program and in what way.
Of course, it is likely that data problems are themselves related to
money spent on environmental programs. According to research
done on EPA enforcement by Professor Joel Mintz, budget shortfalls
are directly linked to poor data keeping and record collection. 1 22
According to Professor Mintz, "when faced with tight budgets,
enforcement managers tend to cut record keeping first rather than
contract the size and principal responsibilities of their staffs of inspectors, engineers, attorneys, etc."1 23
122 See E-mail from Joel Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, to
Author (Dec. 26, 2008, 2:11 EST) (on file with author).
123 Id.
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Whatever the reason, given that data issues have bedeviled
research on environmental enforcement and effectiveness from the
beginning, it seems that the time has come for the EPA to tackle this
head on. To really understand whether state programs are effective
and which programs promote better compliance, the EPA needs to
receive enforcement data and information about resources in a uniform manner. This could be accomplished without impinging on federalism. States can create and operate their budgets in any manner
they see fit, but they (and EPA regions) should be required to report
data on delegated programs in a uniform manner, much as the SEC
requires regulated companies to report data.12 4 One option could be
to require states to organize their data to show how much money was
spent on environmental programs, how much went to enforcement,
and of that, how much went to different kinds of enforcement (as
specified by the EPA), further breaking this all down among delegated programs. The states already have this information, and changing to uniform reporting should not be too difficult. Recently, the
federal government began to require that all states use the federal
definition of graduation and drop rates to avoid the "tangle of inaccurate state data."12 5
Additionally, the EPA's own data system also needs improvement.
Although the EPA has moved in the direction of providing more data
to the public, the current publicly available database, ECHO, is difficult to use. Moreover, longstanding flaws in the data suggest that
there is no effective mechanism to ensure correct reporting and entry
of data.12 6 Funding directed to this alone would be important. It will
continue to be difficult to understand enforcement without these
corrections.
CONCLUSION

Although our modern environmental programs have been in
existence for decades, we have not learned all we need to know about
which ways of enforcing these programs work and which do not. Over
time, diverse scholars have gathered critical data points and contributed to the debate about which types of environmental enforcement
programs are most effective at the lowest cost.
124 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Interactive Data for Financial Reporting, http:/
/www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/interactivedata-secg.htm (last visited on Sept. 20,
2009).
125 Sam Dillon, U.S. to Require States to Use a Single School Dropout Fonnula, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2008, at A16.
126 See, e.g., Clean Water Data, supra note 90.
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In the study we conducted, we were not able to put to rest the
question of which is "better"-cooperative- or deterrence-based
enforcement. In fact, sweeping generalizations are currently difficult
because most every state conducts its programs in a unique way. However, we were able to empirically demonstrate that higher per capita
spending by states on environmental enforcement programs (at least
with respect to the CAA) is strongly associated with better program
compliance, and thus, presumably better environmental results. This
is an important finding and should spur reexamination of theories
about how cheaper enforcement (usually supposed to be cooperativebased) can still provide adequate environmental protection. The
study also creates interesting questions regarding state ideology and
program effectiveness that will have to wait for more comprehensive
data in order to more fully untangle these relationships.
Just as importantly, our study again demonstrates the incredible
difficulty in answering such questions, primarily because of the lack of
data in usable form or the failure to effectively monitor and give attention to the data support systems. Given these ongoing problems in
understanding how well environmental programs work, it is difficult
to avoid reaching the conclusion that the lack of adequate and uniform data is a partial function of the contentious nature of American
politics in which public officials, corporations, and interest groups
may profit from this state of affairs. The EPA is currently undergoing
fundamental reorganization of enforcement because of previous difficulties. This Article should be a call to the EPA to compel uniform
data reporting as part of its comprehensive enforcement upgrade.
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